A closer look at crimes mala in se and mala prohibita
By: Atty. Mary Grace S. Tejada on January 15, 2026
IN criminal law, understanding the distinction between crimes mala in se and mala prohibita is essential for determining the basis for criminal liability and the applicability of legal defenses.
Mala in se crimes are those that are classified as inherently immoral, and the commission of which is generally and universally condemned. Murder, rape, robbery and theft, by reason of their inherent immorality, are considered classic examples of crimes mala in se.
In contrast, mala prohibita crimes are those that are not inherently evil, but are considered wrong simply because there is a statute prohibiting its commission. Examples include the illegal possession or cutting of timber or other forest products, punishable under the Revised Forestry Code (Presidential Decree [PD] 705, as amended) and the illegal possession of firearms, punishable under PD 1866, as amended.
In Dandy L. Dungo and Gregoria A. Sibal Jr. v. People of the Philippines (GR 209464, Jul. 1, 2015), the Supreme Court recognized that there is a common misconception that all mala in se crimes are found in the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, while all mala prohibita crimes are provided by special penal laws.
The Supreme Court clarified that, in reality, however, there may be mala in se crimes under special penal laws, and there may be mala prohibita crimes defined under the RPC.
In Christian Acharon v. People of the Philippines (GR 224946, Nov. 9, 2021), the Supreme Court ruled that denial of financial support under Section 5(i) of Republic Act (RA) 9262, or the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act, is a crime mala in se even if RA 9262 is a special penal law.
Conversely, in Arnold James Ysidoro v. People of the Philippines (GR 192330, Nov. 14, 2012), the Supreme Court classified the crime of technical malversation as malum prohibitum even if it is defined and penalized under the RPC.
To secure a conviction for a crime malum in se, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the accused’s criminal intent. Thus, good faith and lack of criminal intent may be invoked as valid defenses to exonerate the accused.
For crimes mala prohibita, on the other hand, criminal intent is not required to prove criminal liability. Good faith and lack of criminal intent, thus, cannot be invoked as valid defenses.
However, in Felix G. Valenzona v. People of the Philippines (GR 248584, Aug. 30, 2023) (Valenzona case), the Supreme Court clarified that, although in mala prohibita crimes, the prosecution is relieved of the burden of proving criminal intent, it must nevertheless still prove that the accused acted with volition or intent to perpetrate the prohibited act.
In the Valenzona case, an information for violation of PD 957, or the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree, was filed against Felix Valenzona.
The criminal charge stemmed from two contracts to sell involving lots executed between Alsgro Industrial and Development Corp. and Ricardo Porteo.
At the time of the transactions, Valenzona was Alsgro president. It was later discovered, however, that the subject contracts were not registered with the Registry of Deeds, in violation of Section 17 of PD 957.
In acquitting Valenzona, the Supreme Court clarified that, while volition or voluntariness refers to knowledge of the act being done (as opposed to knowledge of the nature of the act), criminal intent is the state of mind that goes beyond voluntariness, and it is this intent which is punished by crimes mala in se.
Thus, for crimes mala in se, there must be proof of criminal intent, while for crimes mala prohibita, it is sufficient that the prohibited act is done freely and consciously.
Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that, even if a violation of PD 957 is malum prohibitum, the prosecution must still prove that the accused intended to perpetrate the prohibited act under the special law.
A review of the records of the case, however, revealed that all that was established was that the subject contracts were not registered by Alsgro, and that Valenzona was the Alsgro president. The prosecution failed to establish that Valenzona had the volition or intent not to register the subject contracts.
The ruling in the Valezona case reinforced a balanced approach in criminal law that upholds the State’s regulatory objectives under penal laws and protects individuals from unjust convictions arising from inadvertent violations of such laws.
Mary Grace S. Tejada is an associate of Mata-Perez, Tamayo & Francisco (MTF Counsel). This article is for general information only and is not a substitute for professional advice where the facts and circumstances warrant. If you have any question or comment regarding this article, you may email the author at info@mtfcounsel.com or visit MTF website at www.mtfcounsel.com.
The article was published at the More to Follow Column at The Manila Times on January 15, 2026. Please see this link.